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What are the fundamental causes of large differences in income per capita across countries? 
Although there is still little consensus on the answers to this question, a growing literature consid-
ers that trust is one of the main determinants of current economic development.1 As stressed by 
Kenneth Arrow (1972), “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much 
of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” A 
prerequisite for the successful development of market economies would be to depart from closed 
group interactions and to enlarge exchanges to anonymous others. In that regard, generalized trust 
and trustworthiness appear as the keystone for successful economic development. This idea has a 
long tradition in the political sciences since the seminal works by Edward C. Banfield (1958), Diego 
Gambetta (1988), James Coleman (1990), Avner Greif (1993), Robert D. Putnam (2000), Putnam, 
Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti (1993), and Francis Fukuyama (1995). This view has 
recently been restated by economists using questions on generalized trust from cross-country social 
surveys like the World Values Survey (see Rafael La Porta et al. 1997; Stephen Knack and Philip 
Keefer 1997; Guido Tabellini forthcoming).
Nonetheless, the economic literature cannot explain easily the causal effect of trust on growth. 
The main reason is that previous studies identify the effect of trust on income per capita from 
cross-country or cross-regional differences, without any time variation. This makes it impossible 
1 In this paper, we focus on beliefs and avoid loaded terms such as “social capital” and “culture.” There is a vast lit-
erature on the determinants of such beliefs and their relationships with institutions and economic outcomes. See, among 
others: Banfield (1958), Gambetta (1988), Coleman (1990), Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993), Knack and Keefer 
(1997), La Porta et al. (1997), Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2004, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009), Tabellini (2008, forthcoming), Algan and Cahuc (2009), Nunn and Wantchekon (2009), and 
Aghion et al. (2010).
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to control for specific invariant national or regional features which could codetermine both trust 
and economic development. For example, Tabellini (forthcoming) analyzes the role of culture 
on income per capita of European regions by using historical variables (institutional history and 
literacy rate) as an instrument for contemporaneous trust. Though this analysis exploits variations 
in the historical variables across regions, which makes it possible to control for country fixed 
effects, it makes it impossible to control for regional fixed effects. It is thus difficult to exclude the 
possibility that some time invariant factors, such as the geography of the region, could cause both 
the low literacy rate in the region and the present low level of trust. This difficulty is common to 
all studies using time invariant instruments for trust, such as hierarchical religions (La Porta et al. 
1997) or ethnic fractionalization (Knack and Keefer 1997).
The above approach leaves open the question as to whether or not the level of trust does matter 
per se in explaining economic development or if it picks up the deeper influence of time invari-
ant features such as legal origins (Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer 2002; La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), the quality of institutions (Robert E. Hall and Charles 
Jones 1999; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2001), initial educa-
tion (Glaeser et al. 2004), the extent of fractionalization (Dani Rodrik 1999, Rodrik, Arvind 
Subramanian, and Francisco Trebbi 2004, Alberto Alesina et al. 2001) or geography (Jeffrey 
D. Sachs 2003). What one needs is thus to find a measure for trust with intertemporal variation, 
allowing one to control for time invariant specific factors. The difficulty in performing such an 
exercise is that there is no long-time series on the evolution of trust. At best, it is possible to go 
back only to the 1980s to have a measure of trust in cross-country surveys.
Our paper provides a new empirical strategy to uncover the causal effect of trust on eco-
nomic development by focusing on the inherited component of trust and on its time varia-
tion over long periods. Since it is already well established that the parents’ social capital is a 
good predictor of the social capital of children (see Tom W. Rice and Jan L. Feldman 1997; 
Putnam 2000; Luigi Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006), we use the trust that US descen-
dants have inherited from their forebears who immigrated from different countries at different 
dates to detect changes in inherited trust in the countries of origin. For instance, by comparing 
Americans with Italian and German origin whose forebears migrated between 1950 and 1980, 
we can detect differences in trust inherited from these two source countries between 1950 and 
1980. We can get time varying measures of trust inherited from these two countries by running 
the same exercise for forebears who immigrated in other periods, for instance between 1920 
and 1950. Once we have obtained time varying measures of inherited trust, we can estimate 
the impact of changes in inherited trust on changes in income per capita in the countries of 
origin. This method allows us to address the main challenges mentioned above in identifying 
the effect of trust on economic development. By focusing on the inherited component of trust, 
we avoid reverse causality. By providing a time varying measure of trust over long periods, 
we can control for both omitted time invariant factors and other observed time varying factors 
such as changes in the economic, political, cultural, and social environments. The estimation 
of inherited trust is based on the General Social Survey, which provides information about the 
contemporaneous trust of US descendants of immigrants and the wave of immigration of their 
forebears. This strategy allows us to track back the evolution of inherited trust over the whole 
twentieth century for 24 countries from all over the world, including Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Continental European countries, Mediterranean European countries, Nordic countries, Eastern 
European countries, India, Mexico, and Africa.
We find that changes in inherited trust explain a substantial part of the changes in economic 
development over the period 1935–2000, even when country fixed effects, past economic devel-
opment, and changes in institutions are accounted for. The differences in income per capita 
in developed countries, relative to Sweden, are overwhelmingly explained by differences in 
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 inherited trust. The lag in income per capita in developing countries is mainly explained by past 
economic development and time invariant factors, but trust also explains a significant share of 
the backwardness of those countries. We show that this result still holds when we look at other 
periods such as 1910–2000 and when we control for the evolution of other institutions, cultural 
values, religion, or education.
Although our paper combines ideas about trust and growth in an apparently novel way, it fol-
lows a large literature on related topics. The first related literature analyzes the impact of social 
capital, including generalized trust, on various economic outcomes. Following Banfield (1958), 
Coleman (1988), and Gambetta (1988), Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) reinvigorated 
research on social capital by showing tremendous dispersion in levels of trust and social capital 
across Italian regions as well as the ability of social capital to predict government performance. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997) are early empirical studies showing that 
social capital is correlated with economic outcomes in a cross-section of countries. Jean-Philippe 
Platteau (2000) explores further this analysis with micro studies in developing countries. Recent 
studies have further advanced this area. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales show how trust can affect 
financial development (2004), economic exchanges (2009), and various economic outcomes such 
as entrepreneurship (2006). Tabellini (forthcoming) shows the relationship between historical 
variables, contemporaneous trust, and development in Europe. Tabellini (forthcoming), Philippe 
Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (forthcoming), Aghion et al. (2010), Algan and Cahuc (2009), and 
Nick Bloom et al. (2007) analyze the relationship between trust and institutions. Paul J. Zak and 
Knack (2001) and Patrick Francois and Jan Zabojnik (2005) provide theoretical models of the 
effect of social capital on economic development.
The second related literature is about the transmission of cultural beliefs or values. Rice and 
Feldman (1997) and Putnam (2000) show that the social capital of US immigrants is correlated 
with civic culture in the home country. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) show that the level 
of trust of US immigrants is affected by the country of origin of their ancestors and highly cor-
related with trust in their home countries. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2007), Nathan Nunn 
and Leonard Wantchekon (2009), and Tabellini (forthcoming) present evidence of deep historical 
roots of contemporaneous variation in trust among regions of Europe or Africa. Alberto Bisin 
and Thierry Verdier (2001), Tabellini (2008), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) focus on 
explicit models of cultural transmission of preferences and beliefs within families. In the same 
vein, Paola Giuliano (2007), Raquel Fernandez (2007), and Fernandez and Allessandra Fogli 
(2009) use the beliefs of immigrants as a proxy for the beliefs of a home country. Fernandez 
(2007) uses attitudes toward women’s work in the home country as an instrument for attitudes 
of US immigrants. Fernandez and Fogli (2009) show that labor participation of US-immigrant 
women is influenced by the country of origin of their mothers. Algan and Cahuc (2007) use 
inherited family values of US immigrants as an instrument for family values in the source country 
to explain cross-country employment heterogeneity.
The main conclusion of this literature is that values or beliefs such as trust have a persistent 
component. This does not mean that these beliefs are completely invariant, though. As shown by 
Putnam (2000), social capital in general and trust in particular has declined dramatically in the 
United States since World War II. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005) document some 
changes in cultural values in a cross-section of countries by exploiting the various waves of the 
World Values Survey. At the theoretical level, Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole (2006) show how 
beliefs can evolve depending on the institutional environment. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2008) show how a temporary shock to the returns to trusting can deeply change the level of 
trust. Our paper combines these different ideas by recognizing that a component of trust can be 
inherited, but that trust can also evolve over long periods. The novelty of our paper is to identify 
empirically the time variation in beliefs, and to relate this time variation in beliefs to growth. We 
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use the evolution of inherited trust of US immigrants to detect historical changes in inherited trust 
in the home countries. This allows us to analyze the relations between changes in inherited trust 
and changes in income per capita in the home countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the estimation strategy and the data. The 
evolution of inherited trust is estimated in Section II. The effect of inherited trust on economic 
development is discussed in Section III. Section IV provides robustness checks, and Section V 
concludes.
I.  Estimation Strategy and Data Description
A. Estimation of Inherited Trust
What is the impact of trust on macroeconomic performance? To answer this question, one has 
to deal with the issue of endogeneity at stake in the estimation of the following equation
(1)  Yct = α0  +  α1Sct  +  α2 Xct  + Fc  + Ft  +  εct ,
where Yct stands for income per capita in country c at period t. The variable Sct measures the 
country average of trust of individuals who live in country c at period t, conditional on their 
individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, employment status, or reli-
gious affiliation. Xct denotes a vector of time varying characteristics of the country. This vector 
might include the past economic development of the economy with the lagged values for income 
per capita or education. It might also include the evolution of the political environment and of 
other cultural norms such as religion. Fc stands for country fixed effects capturing all other time 
invariant specific features such as the legal origins or past institutions with long-lasting effects; 
Ft stands for period fixed effects common to all countries; εct denotes an error term. The inclusion 
of country fixed effects ensures that the correlation between economic performance and attitudes 
is not driven by unobservable country time invariant specific factors.
The problem with equation (1) is that contemporaneous trust is likely to be correlated with the 
unobserved error term εct. For instance, individuals who live in a more secure environment are 
likely to trust others more and to be more efficient. To tackle this issue, we need to explain how 
trust is determined. Studies by Bisin and Verdier (2001), Bisin et al. (2004), Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales (2008), and Tabellini (2008) stress the role of two main forces. A part of social attitudes 
is shaped by the contemporaneous environment, and another part is shaped by inherited beliefs 
from earlier generations. This suggests positing the following model:
(2)  Sct = γ0  +  γ1 Sct−1  +  γ2 Xct  + Φc  + Φt  +  νct
where Φc and Φt stand for country and time dummies respectively; Sct−1 denotes the country 
average of trust of the previous generation in period t − 1; νct is an error term. In equation (2), it 
is assumed that current trust of individuals of working age are determined by all factors likely to 
influence economic performance and by the level of trust of the previous generations. Note that 
the assumption that the trust of previous generations is excluded from the economic performance 
equation (1) allows us to identify, together with the assumption that εct ⟘ Sct−1, the parameters 
of the system of equations (1) and (2). Data availability and the concern to proceed with periods 
separated by a sufficient large gap led us to consider, in the benchmark estimation of the model, 
two periods: 1935–1938 and 2000–2003. Alternative periods are considered in the robustness 
checks section.
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The estimation of the system of equations (1) and (2) raises two main concerns.
First, we do not have any information on Sct−1, since standardized cross-country databases on 
the level of trust of earlier generations are not available. At best, it is possible to go back only to 
the 1980s to get a measure of trust in a cross-section of countries using the World Values Survey. 
To cope with the lack of information on social attitudes of the previous generations, we proxy the 
inherited trust of people living in country c by the trust that the descendants of US immigrants have 
inherited from their ancestors coming from country c. More precisely, inherited trust is measured 
by the country of origin fixed effect in individual regressions of the contemporaneous attitudes of 
US descendants of immigrants. This yields an estimate of the term γ1Sct−1 in equation (2), which we 
use as a proxy for inherited trust. This strategy leads us to estimate a single equation of the form (1), 
where Sct is replaced by our proxy of inherited attitudes. The coefficient associated with inherited 
trust then reflects the correlation between inherited trust and contemporaneous income per capita.
Second, even if we have a good proxy for inherited trust, the correlation between inherited values 
and contemporaneous economic outcomes can be interpreted as a causal effect from inherited trust 
to contemporaneous outcomes only if these two variables are not codetermined by common fac-
tors. For example, it is possible that changes in inherited trust and income per capita are driven by 
changes in initial economic conditions, in institutions, or in any other time varying factors. To deal 
with this issue, we take two avenues. First, we control for other changes in the economic, political, 
and social environments. Second, we implement robustness checks in which we consider long time 
lags between inherited trust of US immigrants and contemporaneous income per capita in the home 
country. It thus becomes unlikely that changes in inherited trust are driven by changes in variables 
that could directly impact both inherited trust and contemporaneous economic outcomes.
B. Data Description
Economic performance is measured by income per capita expressed in 1990 US dollars. We 
use the Maddison database which covers the period 1820–2003.
Trust of individuals born in the United States is provided by the General Social Survey data-
base (GSS). This database covers the period 1972–2004 and provides information on the birth-
place and the country of origin of the respondent’s forebears since 1977. The GSS variable for the 
country of origin reads as follows: “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors 
come?” The individual can report up to three countries of origin by order of preference. Two 
respondents out of three report only one country of origin. We select the GSS ethnic variable 
that captures the country of origin to which the respondent feels the closest to make the com-
parison between countries of origin interpretable. We have a large number of observations for 
at least 24 countries or continents. The countries of origin cover almost all European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and Yugoslavia. The GSS database also reports information for Canada, Mexico, and India, and 
the category African origins. We present only the countries of origin displaying 15 or more obser-
vations in our estimations. The number of observations is reported in Table A1.
We measure the path of cultural transmission of trust by using the waves of immigration. 
Respondents are asked if they were born in the United States and how many of their parents 
and grandparents were born in the country. The answers to the question of parents’ birthplace 
are scaled 0 if both parents were born in the United States, 1 if only the mother was born in the 
United States, and 2 if only the respondent’s father was born in the country. The answers to the 
grandparents’ birthplace are scaled from 0 to 4 indicating the number of grandparents born in the 
United States. This information makes it possible to disentangle four potential waves of immigra-
tions: fourth-generation Americans (more than two grandparents born in the United States and 
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both parents born in the United States), third-generation Americans (at least two grandparents 
immigrated to the United States and both parents were born in the United States), second-gener-
ation Americans (at least one parent born abroad), and first-generation Americans.
Trust is measured by the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The answers are 
given on a scale from 1 to 3, which corresponds to “Most people can be trusted,” “Can’t be too 
careful,” and “Depends.” We construct a trust indicator equal to 1 if the respondent answers that 
people can be trusted and 0 if he considers that one cannot be too careful or that it depends. We 
group together the two latter responses to make a clear separation between high trusting individu-
als as opposed to moderate or low trusting ones. This will also allow a direct mapping with the 
trust question in the World Values Survey (WVS). The results are hardly affected by the treatment 
of the answer “Depends” in the GSS. As shown by Table A1, the share of answers “Depends” 
is marginal for almost all countries of origin. We have run robustness checks by dropping the 
answers “Depends” or by grouping this answer with the answer “Most people can be trusted,” 
with the same conclusions. The results are reported in the Appendix.
Trust in the home country is measured by using the World Values Survey (WVS) database. The 
WVS covers all the set of countries defined as potential country of origin in the GSS database. 
The trust question in the WVS has exactly the same wording as that of the GSS: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?” But the WVS allows for only two answers: 1 for “Most people can be 
trusted,” and 0 for “Can’t be too careful.” Table A1 reports the number of observations and the 
decomposition of the trust question for the WVS. We select the wave 2000 of the WVS to provide 
a benchmark comparison with inherited attitudes in 2000 in the GSS. We use the wave 1995 to 
get information for Switzerland and Norway.
II.  Inherited Trust of US immigrants and Trust in the Home Country
A. Inherited Trust
This section documents how we estimate the evolution of trust transmitted from the source 
country over the twentieth century. This analysis is based on the GSS. We have to specify the lag 
that we impose between the inherited trust and the contemporaneous economic outcome at date 
T. We take a benchmark lag of 25 years, which implies that we focus on attitudes transmitted 
before the date T − 25. We also assume a gap of 25 years between two generations. Accordingly, 
we focus on inherited trust of: i) second generation Americans born before T − 25, since the 
parents of the second generation immigrated before T − 25; ii) third-generation Americans born 
before T − 25  +  25, since the grandparents of the third generation born before T immigrated 
before T − 25; and iii) fourth-generation Americans born before T − 25  +  50.2 We document 
below the estimates of inherited trust for the periods 1935–1938 and 2000–2003, with a mini-
mum lag of 25 years between inherited trust and income per capita. We look at different periods 
and lags structure in the robustness checks section and in the Appendix.
We start by focusing on inherited trust in the two periods 1935–1938 and 2000–2003 (1935 
and 2000 henceforth). We measure inherited trust for these periods by using the transmission 
pattern described above. We assume that all people alive in a period may influence the income 
2 Note that in the case of fourth-generation immigrants, we consider individuals born after date T. Nonetheless they 
have inherited the attitudes prevailing before date T − 25. We consider different generations of immigration to get the 
maximum of observation on inherited trust before date T − 25. But we show that our results still hold when we focus on 
subgroups of generations of immigration.
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per capita of the period. Therefore, inherited trust in 1935–1938 is that of second-generation 
Americans born before 1910 (i.e., whose parents arrived for sure one generation before 1935), of 
third-generation Americans born before 1935, and of fourth-generation Americans born before 
1960. In the same way, the level of inherited trust in 2000–2003 corresponds to the trust inherited 
by: second-generation Americans born between 1910 and 1975; third-generation Americans born 
after 1935; and fourth-generation Americans born after 1960. This decomposition excludes any 
overlap in the inherited trust of the two groups. Table A2 reports the number of observations for 
these groups. Table A3 reports the sample characteristics.
Table 1 reports the OLS estimates of inherited trust for the periods 1935 and 2000. The pro-
bit estimates yield very similar results. We run a single regression by grouping together the two 
Table I—Inherited Trust in 1935 and 2000
Dependent variables
(1) Inherited trust (2) Inherited trust
in 1935 in 2000
Coeff Standard error Coeff Standard error
Country of origin Swedish ancestors - 1935 : Reference
Sweden 0.052*** (0.004)
Africa −0.231*** (0.004) −0.243*** (0.007)
Austria −0.031*** (0.004) 0.102*** (0.011)
Belgium 0.073*** (0.013) 0.134*** (0.021)
Canada −0.024** (0.010) 0.078** (0.015)
Czech Republic 0.006 (0.008) −0.052*** (0.009)
Denmark 0.045*** (0.002) 0.157*** (0.004)
Finland −0.032*** (0.003) 0.172*** (0.003)
France 0.040*** (0.004) −0.047*** (0.010)
Germany 0.024*** (0.001) −0.004 (0.008)
Hungary 0.023*** (0.004) 0.020* (0.011)
India −0.041*** (0.009) −0.376*** (0.012)
Ireland 0.030*** (0.003) −0.025* (0.012)
Italy −0.022* (0.012) −0.086*** (0.016)
Mexico 0.101*** (0.014) −0.125*** (0.015)
Netherlands −0.039*** (0.003) 0.051*** (0.005)
Norway 0.156*** (0.001) 0.113*** (0.003)
Poland 0.047*** (0.014) −0.052*** (0.015)
Portugal 0.004 (0.009) 0.002 (0.017)
Russia 0.171*** (0.012) −0.068*** (0.007)
Spain −0.052*** (0.009) 0.042** (0.015)
Switzerland 0.058*** (0.002) 0.102*** (0.007)
United Kingdom 0.043*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.007)
Yugoslavia 0.303*** (0.010) −0.018 (0.016)
R2 0.105
Observations 11026
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US immigrants from the periods 
1935 and 2000. Trust is measured from the answer to the question: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with peo-
ple?” The answers are given on a scale from 1 to 3, which corresponds to “Most people can be 
trusted,” “Can’t be too careful,” and “Depends.” The trust indicator is equal to 1 if the respondent 
answers that people can be trusted and 0 if he considers that one cannot be too careful or that it 
depends. Additional controls: age, age (square), gender, education, income, employment status, 
and religion. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: General Social Survey 1977–2004.
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 periods, and we interact the dummy period with the country of origin dummy to distinguish 
inherited trust in 1935 and 2000. Trust inherited in 1935 by the Swedish Americans is used as 
the reference group. In addition to the country-of-ancestry dummies, we control for age (age 
squared), gender, education, employment status, religion, and the income category. The variable 
income varies from 1 to 12, a higher value indicating a higher income category.3 As a robustness 
check, we have also included the education of the parents to control for the fact that inherited 
trust might transit through parents’ human capital rather than through cultural transmission. The 
number of observations is lower, but without any change in the results. All estimations include 
year dummies to control for specific temporal shocks. All standard errors are corrected for clus-
tering at the country level.
Column 1 reports the estimates for inherited trust in 1935, relative to trust inherited by 
Swedish Americans in 1935. Having forebears coming from a different country of origin than 
Sweden has a statistically significant effect on inherited trust. For some countries of origin like 
the United Kingdom, the effect is statistically even more significant than the one found for 
the period 2000. This result suggests that inherited trust is strongly persistent. The trust inher-
ited in 1935 from Continental European or Anglo-Saxon countries tends to be higher than that 
inherited from Sweden. The probability to trust others is 4 percentage points higher for French 
Americans, 4.3 percentage points higher for British Americans, and 2.4 percentage points 
higher for German Americans. Inherited trust in 1935 is also higher for some Eastern European 
countries like the Czech Republic or Hungary. In contrast, inherited trust from Mediterranean 
countries, Latin American countries, Africa, and India is lower than that of Swedish Americans 
in 1935.
Column 2 reports trust inherited in 2000 relative to trust inherited by Swedish Americans in 
1935. Inherited trust displays substantial changes between the two periods. First, the Swedish 
Americans have inherited higher trust in 2000 relative to the period 1935. Second, inherited 
trust from Continental European countries, and to a lesser extent from the United Kingdom, has 
deteriorated over the period. Trust inherited in 2000 from French ancestors is 4.7 percentage 
points lower relative to trust inherited from Sweden in 1935. Inherited trust has decreased even 
more among the immigrants from Eastern European countries and Mediterranean countries. In 
contrast, inherited trust has increased for individuals with Nordic ancestors. The effects of other 
individual characteristics are reported in Table 2. Trust increases with age, education, and the 
level of income, but religious affiliation turns out to have no impact.
Explaining changes in inherited trust within countries is beyond the scope of our paper. The 
set of potential candidates is quite wide. One might first think about the role of national shocks 
such as wars. The ancestors of the current US respondents are likely to have undergone very 
different national crises. The ancestors who have transmitted their trust for the period 1935 have 
mainly migrated before World Wars I and II. The social attitudes of immigrants from countries 
deeply affected by these crises, like France, Germany, or Eastern European countries, might 
have deteriorated between this period compared to descendants from Sweden, since this latter 
country is one of the European countries least affected by these traumatic events. This finding 
would be consistent with those obtained by Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara (2002) and Nunn and 
Wantchekon (2009), who show that a history of traumatic experience is associated with low 
trust.
Other potential explanations of changes in trust might be linked to institutions or economic 
conditions. Sweden was much poorer than other European countries at the end of the nineteenth 
century, and mass emigration to America became the only way to prevent famine and  rebellion: 
3 The GSS also reports information on total wealth, but for too few households to get a representative sample.
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over 1 percent of the population emigrated annually during the 1880s. Besides, Sweden was marked 
in the early 1900s by a world record for days lost in labor disputes and strong class conflicts. This 
suggests a low level of generalized trust. But the leaders ultimately reached an agreement that 
ended the labor conflicts and led to the creation of the Swedish welfare state. The same holds true 
for Denmark at the end of the nineteenth century. In contrast, most Continental European, Eastern 
European, and Mediterranean countries were affected by the rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s, 
and Eastern European countries were ruled by communist regimes after World War II. Such events 
might have deep effects on social capital. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) stresses the long-
term negative effect of authoritarian regimes and social capital, with an application to the history 
of Italy. Alesina and Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007) show that communism had deeply changed 
a wide set of beliefs by comparing East and West Germany. In the same vein, Aghion, Algan, and 
Cahuc (forthcoming). (2010) and Aghion et al. (2010) show that some political and economic 
institutions might have crowded out trust in European countries relative to Nordic countries.
B. Correlation Between Inherited Trust and Trust in the Home Country
This section documents the relationship between inherited trust and trust in the home country. 
If there is a cultural transmission of trust within families, we should find a statistically significant 
correlation between inherited trust of the descendants of US immigrants and trust in their country 
of origin. Besides, if trust has evolved in the country of origin over the century, the correlation 
between the trust inherited at the beginning of the twentieth century and the level of trust in the 
home country nowadays should be weaker.
We estimate the relationship between inherited trust and trust in the home country in the fol-
lowing way. We run individual regressions on the trust question of the GSS as in the previous 
section. But we replace the country of origin fixed effect by the average trust in the home country, 
calculated from the wave 2000 of the WVS. We run these estimates on the same samples and by 
using the same controls as in the previous estimates.
Table 2—Correlation Between Individual Characteristics and Trust
Dependent variable:
Inherited trust in the US
Controls Coeff Standard error
Age 0.007*** (0.001)
Age2 −0.000** (0.000)
Men 0.021*** (0.008)
Education 0.032*** (0.002)
Income category 0.010*** (0.001)
Employed 0.005 (0.014)
Unemployed −0.045*** (0.017)
Catholic 0.026 (0.027)
Protestant 0.007 (0.014)
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US immigrants for the period 
1935 and 2000. The Table presents the coefficient associated with the individual characteris-
tics of the OLS regressions presented in Table 1. Income category: 12 income categories, a 
higher value indicating a higher income category. Education: number of years of education. 
Reference: no religion and inactive. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source : General Social Survey 1977-2004.
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Table 3 column 1 reports the results for the period 2000.4 The correlation between inherited 
trust in the United States and trust in the home country is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Column 2 reports the results when we regress inherited trust in 1935 on trust in the country 
of origin in 2000. The correlation is no longer statistically significant. This result suggests that 
the trust transmitted in 1935 from the source country was different from the level transmitted in 
2000. Note that an alternative interpretation of this weak correlation could be a convergence in 
inherited trust of US immigrants as the time spent in the host country increases. Yet the previous 
section has shown that this explanation is unlikely since the coefficients of the country of origin 
measuring inherited trust in 1935 were statistically highly significant. Column 3 confirms this 
result by focusing on inherited trust in 2000 for the subgroup of fourth-generation immigrants 
4 Table 3 presents benchmark estimates that group together different generations of immigration of different ages to 
measure inherited trust for a given period. The Appendix reports estimates by subgroups of waves of immigration.
Table 3—Correlation Between Inherited Trust of US Immigrants  
and Trust in Their Source Country
Dependent variables
Inherited trust 
in 2000
Inherited trust 
in 1935
Inherited trust 
in 2000 
4th generation
(1) (2) (3)
Trust in home country 
 WVS 2000
0.462*** 
(0.142)
0.419 
(0.268)
0.461** 
(0.211)
Age 0.004*** 
(0.000)
0.002*** 
(0.000) −0.002 (0.003)
Men 0.028*** 
(0.012)
0.018 
(0.011)
0.020 
(0.016)
Education 0.036*** 
(0.003)
0.035*** 
(0.002)
0.044 
(0.007)
Income category 0.010*** 
(0.002)
0.015*** 
(0.002)
0.011*** 
(0.003)
Employed −0.005 
(0.024)
0.015 
(0.023) −0.030 (0.033)
Unemployed −0.077** 
(0.037)
−0.020 
(0.039)
−0.049 
(0.044)
Protestant −0.005 
(0.021)
0.001 
(0.026) −0.015 (0.028)
Catholic −0.002 
(0.027)
0.063** 
(0.030) −0.031 (0.032)
Observations 4,491 6,535 2,065
R2 0.077 0.080 0.066
Notes: The dependent variables are (1) the level of trust inherited by US immigrants in the 
period 2000; (2) the level of trust inherited by US immigrants in the period 1935; (3) the level 
of trust inherited by fourth-generation US immigrants in the period 2000. Trust in home coun-
try is the average level of trust in the source country of the US immigrants in the period 2000. 
Reference group: inactive and nonreligious. OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source : General Social Survey 1977–2004; World Values Survey wave 2000.
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(born after 1960). The correlation with trust in the home country is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level.5
Figures 1 and 2 provide a complementary picture for this result by displaying the scatterplot of 
trust in the home country in 2000 against inherited trust of US immigrants for the periods 2000 
and 1935 respectively. Swedes and descendants of Swedish immigrants of the corresponding 
periods are taken as the reference group. We control for age, gender, education, income, employ-
ment status, and religious affiliation. The correlation between trust in the home country in 2000 
and inherited trust in 2000 of US immigrants is fairly high. The only outlier is India, and the coef-
ficient of determination is 0.19. In contrast, no clear correlation pattern appears in Figure 2 when 
5 An additional interpretation could be that the selection of immigrants from the home countries varied over the twen-
tieth century, and that this weakens the relationship between trust in the home country and inherited trust of US immi-
grants. In particular, the incentives for immigrating from Eastern European countries were likely to be different before 
and after World War II. Changes in trust could thus be linked to changes in the sample selection of immigrants. However, 
we can get a sense of this potential concern by comparing trust in the home country and inherited trust in the United States 
during the same period 2000, the only period where trust and inherited trust can be observed jointly. Table 3 shows that 
there is a strong correlation between trust in the source country and inherited trust of US immigrants from their source 
country for this period. Moreover, Table 3 column 3 shows that for the period 2000, trust in the source country is cor-
related not only with trust inherited by second-generation immigrants, but also with trust inherited by fourth-generation 
immigrants whose forebears arrived in the United States much before those of second-generation immigrants. This result 
suggests that the changing time pattern of the selection of immigrants is not a key issue in our analysis.
Figure 1. Correlation between Trust in the Home Country in 2000  
and Inherited Trust of Descendants of US Immigrants for the Period 2000
Source: WVS 2000 and GSS 1977-2004.
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we look at inherited trust in 1935. Most of the continental European countries or Anglo-Saxon 
countries display higher inherited trust relative to Sweden in 1935, while trust in the source coun-
try is lagging behind trust in Sweden in 2000.
A last important question is whether these different correlations are just a product of luck or if 
they truly capture inherited values from the country of origin. To address this issue, one can run a 
regression on the GSS of the trust levels of, for example, Italian Americans, on the average trust 
of Chinese in China calculated with the WVS 2000. If one generalizes this test to all countries 
of origin and finds a positive and statistically significant correlation between inherited trust from 
country i and contemporaneous trust in country i′ ≠ i, one would suspect spurious correlation 
in these estimates. To further explore this issue, we implement the following test. We draw ran-
domly from a uniform distribution the home country of the US immigrants. We then regress the 
individual trust question in the GSS on the average trust of a home country picked randomly from 
the group of 24 potential source countries. We still control for age, education, gender, employ-
ment status, income category, and religious affiliation.
Table 4 reports the result for inherited trust in 2000 and 1935. The correlation turns out to be 
negative and close to zero for the period 2000, and slightly positive for the period 1935. In both 
cases, the correlations are not statistically significant, suggesting that our previous estimates were 
not driven by spurious correlation.
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and Inherited Trust of Descendants of US Immigrants for the Period 1935
Source: WVS 2000 and GSS 1977–2004.
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III.  The Effect of Inherited Trust on Growth
This section presents the estimates of the impact of inherited trust on growth. We first analyze 
the cross-country relationship between inherited trust and income per capita. Then, we focus on 
the effect of changes in inherited trust on changes in income per capita over time.
A. Cross-Country Correlations Between Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita
We begin with cross-country correlation between inherited trust and income per capita in the 
countries of origin. The dependent variable is the income gap relative to Sweden in 1935 and in 
2000. The main explanatory variable is the level of inherited trust measured by the coefficient 
associated with the country of origin fixed effect in the GSS. We get these coefficients by running 
OLS regressions separately for 1935 and 2000, taking the Swedish Americans in 1935 and 2000 
as the reference group respectively.
Figure 3 shows the cross-country correlation between inherited trust and income per capita in 
2000. The correlation is positive and large. Fifty-four percent of the cross-country heterogeneity 
in income per capita relative to Sweden is associated with differences in inherited trust. When 
Africa and India are excluded, the coefficient of determination is still 0.38.
Table 5 reports the corresponding OLS regression. Column 1 reports the bottom down regres-
sion without any controls. The correlation between inherited trust and income per capita is sta-
tistically significant at the 1 percent level and is economically sizeable. Inherited trust explains 
more than one-third of the cross-country heterogeneity in economic development.
Column 2 controls for lagged income per capita in 1870 and 1930, using Angus Maddison’s 
database. The strong dependence of current economic development on initial economic condi-
tions is naturally a well-established fact. Moreover, the initial economic development in the home 
country at the time immigration took place could codetermine both the current income per capita 
in the home country and the inherited trust of US immigrants’ descendants. Column 2 shows that 
the correlation between inherited trust and income per capita is lowered by almost half when 
Table 4—Correlation Between Inherited Trust of US Immigrants  
and Trust in a Random Source Country - Counterfactual Test
Dependent variables
Inherited trust 
in 2000
Inherited trust 
in 1935
(1) (2)
Trust in a random source country −0.021 
(0.102)
0.230 
(0.161)
Observations 4,491 6,535
R2 0.064 0.076
Notes: The dependent variables are (1) the level of trust inherited by US immigrants in the 
period 2000; (2) the level of trust inherited by US immigrants in the period 1935. The main 
explanatory variable is the average trust in a country different from the source country of the 
US immigrants. The country associated to the US immigrants is drawn randomly from a uni-
form distribution. Additional controls: age, gender, education, income, employment status, and 
religion. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: General Social Survey 1977–2004; World Values Survey wave 2000.
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controlling for the lagged value of income per capita. But the correlation is still statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level, and the impact is still economically sizeable as discussed below.
Column 3 adds contemporaneous political institutions using the synthetic variable Polity2 
from the Polity IV dataset. This variable is originally scaled between −10 and 10. Higher values 
correspond to more democratic political institutions. Since all variables in our regression are 
measured relative to Sweden, we rescale the Polity2 variable between 0 and 20 and look at the 
difference with Sweden. We take the average of this indicator over the periods 1935–1938 and 
2000–2003. Data are missing for India. The correlation between inherited trust and income per 
capita is still statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Column 4 excludes Africa and India, which appear as potential outliers in the previous graphs. 
Inherited trust remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and the effect is of the same 
order of magnitude.
B. Changes in Inherited Trust and Changes in Income Per Capita
We turn to the correlation between changes in inherited trust and changes in income per cap-
ita over time. Figure 4 reports a scatterplot of the changes in income per capita between 1935 
and 2000 against the changes in inherited trust between the same periods, relative to Sweden. 
The change in inherited trust is measured by the change in the value of the country of origin 
fixed effects in separate regressions on the trust question for the periods 1935 and 2000. The 
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Figure 3. Correlation between Income per Capita and Inherited Trust in 2000, Relative to Sweden
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 correlation is positive and steady; 45 percent of the change in income per capita is associated 
with change in inherited trust.
Table 6 reports the within effect of inherited trust on economic development controlling for 
country fixed effects. Column 1 reports the bottom down estimates without additional control. 
Change in inherited trust is strongly correlated with change in income per capita. Column 2 
controls for changes in initial income per capita. The coefficient associated with inherited trust 
is lowered but still significant at the 1 percent level. Column 3 checks for potential outliers by 
excluding Africa. We have also checked the results when Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway) are excluded, with the same conclusion. Column 4 controls for political institutions. 
Column 5 reports the results using an alternative measure of income per capita in 1935 and 
2000. To smooth out short-run fluctuations, we also calculated income per capita as a ten years 
average (instead of four years average) 1928–1938 and 1994–2004. For each specification, the 
correlation between change in inherited trust and change in income per capita is significant at the 
1 percent level.
Quantitative Effects of Inherited Trust.—The results displayed in Table 6 imply that the impact 
of inherited trust on income per capita is economically sizeable. Figure 5 displays the change in 
income per capita in period 2000–2003 that countries would have experienced if the level of inher-
ited trust in a given country had been the same as trust inherited from Sweden. This analysis is 
based on the fully fledged estimates reported in Table 6 column 4 for which country fixed effects, 
lagged value of GDP per capita, and contemporaneous political environment are controlled. GDP 
per capita in 2000 would have been increased by 546 percent in Africa (not reported) if the level 
of inherited trust had been the same as inherited trust from Sweden. Africa and poor countries 
are obviously extreme cases. It is well documented that these developing countries are lacking 
interpersonal trust. As Banfield (1958), Marcel Fafchamps (1996), or Platteau (2000) argued, 
Table 5—Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita in 1935 and 2000:  
Cross-Country Regression
Dependent variable:
Income per capita in 1935 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inherited trust 
 in 1935 and 2000
35,952.13***
(6,811.83)
18,389.59***
(4,811.88)
18,601.70*** 
(5,708.99)
20,030.74*** 
(6,966.35)
Initial income per capita 
 1870 and 1930
3.83*** 
(0.45)
3.84*** 
(0.53)
3.64*** 
(0.54)
Political institutions 
 in 1930 and 2000
1.45 
(74.73)
32.50 
(82.03)
Outliers Africa, India 
excluded
R2 0.37 0.75 0.69 0.63
Observations 48 48 46 44
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries 
in 1935 and 2000, relative to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. Inherited trust of US immi-
grants from the source countries for the periods 1935 and 2000 is estimated relative to the 
trust inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ancestors for those periods. The coefficients of 
inherited trust come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions are measured by the 
index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institu-
tions. Institutions in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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traditional societies are characterized by pervasive intragroup trust but low intergroup trust. The 
functioning of markets is drastically limited when trust is circumscribed to small groups. Figure 5 
shows that inherited trust also has a nonnegligible impact on GDP per capita in Eastern European 
countries and Mexico. Income per capita would have increased by 69 percent in Russia, 59 
percent in Mexico, 30 percent in Yugoslavia, 29 percent in the Czech Republic, and 9 percent 
in Hungary had these countries inherited the same level of trust as Sweden. The effect, if less 
important, is also sizeable in more developed countries. Income per capita would have been up 
by 17 percent in Italy, 11 percent in France, 7 percent in Germany, and 6 percent in the United 
Kingdom if these countries had the same level of inherited trust as Sweden.
The Relative Role of Convergence, Time Invariant Factors, and Inherited Trust.—What is the 
impact of inherited trust relative to the economic and political environments and to time invariant 
factors? One thing we know about growth is that it is a dynamic process and that changes prior 
to 1935 may be associated with long periods of transition dynamics, so that it is very misleading 
to think that changes in outcomes between 1935 and 2000 need to be associated with changes in 
underlying factors only after 1935. Accordingly, our estimates control for the lagged income per 
capita in the 1870s and the 1930s for explaining income per capita in 1935 and 2000 respectively. 
We can thus calculate the predicted changes in income per capita if the countries were starting from 
the same initial economic development as Sweden, assuming as given other time invariant institu-
tions, social attitudes, and political institutions.
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Figure 6 shows the predicted increase in income per capita in 2000. Africa (not reported) 
would have an income per capita 529 percent higher, while Russia and Mexico would have an 
income per capita 113 percent and 74 percent higher. But countries which used to be more devel-
oped than Sweden, like the United Kingdom or France, would have experienced a drop in income 
per capita by 22 percent and 5 percent respectively.
Figure 7 reports the contribution of time invariant factors. We calculate the predicted increase 
in income per capita if the countries had the same country fixed effect as Sweden. Africa (not 
reported)  would have an income per capita 265 percent higher. Eastern European countries 
would have undergone an increase by 200 percent in Yugoslavia, 168 percent in Russia, 82 per-
cent in Hungary, and 78 percent in Poland. Mexico would have increased its income per capita 
by 92 percent. The effect of time invariant factors is thus of the same order of magnitude as initial 
economic development for this set of countries and three times as big as the effect of inherited 
trust in general. The role of time invariant factors is much lower among more advanced European 
countries. For example, the income per capita would have been up only by 4.2 percent and 5.7 
percent in Mediterranean countries like Italy or Spain. Income per capita would have been even 
lower in France.
As a conclusion, the changes in income per capita in developed countries, relative to Sweden, 
are overwhelmingly explained by differences in inherited trust. This result can be understood by 
the fact that these countries have economic environments and political institutions close to those 
of Sweden. The main differences are explained by the heterogeneity in trust. Initial economic 
factors and invariant factors explain in general most of the differences in income per capita 
of developing countries relative to Sweden. This result is consistent with the growth literature 
stressing the role of initial economic development and of invariant factors, such as colonial insti-
tutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), legal origins (Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2008), or geography (Sachs 2003). But our results show that the evolution of trust also 
has an economically tremendous impact on income differences in these countries, which has not 
Table 6—Inherited Trust and Income per Capita in 1935 And 2000: within Estimates
Dependent variable: Income per capita in 1935 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inherited trust 
 in 1935 and 2000
41,007.70***
(6,041.57)
27,332.62***
(7,179.62)
31,198.48***
(7,231.02)
28,230.15***
(7,350.49)
23,930.95***
(6,181.20)
Initial income per capita 
 in 1870 and 1930
2.93*** 
(1.03)
2.17* 
(1.14)
2.81** 
(1.02)
2.65*** 
(0.86)
Political institutions in 1930 
 and 2000
−149.34 
(89.41)
−103.15 
(75.18)
Outliers Africa
excluded
 Country fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
R2 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88
Observations 48 48 46 46 46
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries in 1935 and 2000, rela-
tive to Sweden. GDP per capita is averaged over 10 years in column 5. Data come from Maddison. Inherited trust of US 
immigrants from the source countries for the periods 1935 and 2000 is estimated relative to the trust inherited by US 
immigrants with Swedish ancestors for those periods. The coefficients of inherited trust come from the regressions on the 
GSS. Political institutions are measured by the index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more 
democratic institutions. Institutions in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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been accounted for so far. In contrast, changes in political institutions do not play a significant 
role when inherited trust and initial economic development are controlled for.6 The next section 
checks for the robustness of these results by including other time varying factors such as religion, 
education, or other inherited cultural values, and by addressing the issue of omitted variables.
6 The variable political institution is always associated with a negative sign since Sweden displays the highest value of 
Polity IV in 1935 and 2000 and the variable is expressed relative to Sweden.
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IV.  Robustness Checks
The validity of our approach relies on the assumption that the relationship between inherited 
trust and contemporaneous income per capita is not driven by omitted variables. Even if the pre-
vious section imposes a minimum lag of 25 years between inherited trust and income per capita, 
and controls for time invariant factors, past economic environment, and political institutions, the 
exogeneity of inherited trust might still be of concern. This section provides various robustness 
checks to address this issue.
A. Longer Generation Gaps
In the main section, we deal with omitted variables by including country fixed effects in the 
income per capita equation. This does not, however, completely solve the concern of omitted vari-
ables because unobservable time varying components might be correlated with both changes in 
inherited trust and changes in income per capita in each country. One may think of specific time 
varying factors affecting both inherited trust in the host country and income per capita in the home 
country. We deal with this issue by increasing the lag between inherited trust and contemporary 
income per capita. This makes it less likely that unobservable time varying components could drive 
changes in inherited trust and current income per capita in the source country. The previous esti-
mates assume a lag of at least one generation, namely, at least 25 years between inherited trust and 
contemporaneous income per capita. We now increase this lag up to two generations, which implies 
a gap of at least 50 years. To get enough observations, we include in the second-, third-, and fourth-
generation immigrants individuals with at least one parent born in the United States.
This analysis is run for the periods 1935 and 2000. In the Appendix, we increase the lag up to 
three generations, implying a gap of at least 75 years. Because of the limits of the dataset between 
1935–2000, we use the period 1950–2000 to explore further the effect of a gap of three genera-
tions, as shown in the Appendix.
According to our previous estimation strategy, imposing a minimum lag of 50 years between 
the ancestors’ wave of immigration and contemporaneous income per capita leads us to select 
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the following two groups. To explain the income per capita in 1935, we select second-generation 
descendants of the immigrants born before 1885, third-generation descendants of the immigrants 
born before 1910, and fourth-generation descendants of the immigrants born before 1935. For 
the period 2000, we focus on the attitudes of second-generation US immigrants born before 1950 
(and after 1885 to avoid any overlap between these groups of second-generation immigrants), 
third-generation immigrants born after 1910 (and before 1975) and fourth generation born after 
1935 (and before 2000). We select only countries of origin with more than 10 observations in the 
individual regressions on the trust question, leading us to focus on 16 countries of origin. The 
samples of the different groups are reported in tables A3 and A4. Inherited trust is still measured 
by running OLS estimates on the GSS trust question and controlling for age, education, and gen-
der. Inherited attitudes of Swedish Americans in 1935 are taken as the reference group.
Figures 8 and 9 report the correlation between income per capita and inherited trust when we 
impose a lag of at least 50 years between the inherited trust of the US immigrants’ ancestors and 
income per capita in the home country. The correlation remains steady, the coefficient of deter-
mination being 0.25 and 0.59 for the periods 1935 and 2000 respectively.
Table 7 reports the corresponding OLS regressions. Column 1 reports the results for the cross-
country estimates. Column 2 shows the within estimates without any control. Column 3 includes 
the lagged income per capita and the current political constraint. The coefficient associated with 
inherited trust is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in cross-country regressions, and at 
5 percent in time variation.
Figure 8. Correlation between Income per Capita and Inherited Trust in 1935, Relative to Sweden.  
Minimum 50 Year Lag between Ancestors’ Immigration Wave and Contemporaneous Income per Capita 
Sources: Maddison database and GSS 1977–2004.
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B. Longer Period Gaps: Income Per Capita Between 1910 and 2000
To make sure that our previous results do not rely on specific features of the period 1935–2000, 
we look at different periods. In particular we consider a wider gap by focusing on income per 
capita in 1910 and 2000. These two periods are separated by the main major events of the twenti-
eth century, including the two World Wars, the 1929 crisis, and the emergence of conflicting ide-
ologies in the world. Besides, the period 1910 provides us with enough observations to estimate 
inherited attitudes from almost all countries.
Inherited Trust in 1910.—We estimate inherited attitudes in 1910 by using exactly the same 
cultural transmission model as above. To get enough observations for the period 1910, we use 
a lag of at least 25 years between inherited attitudes and contemporaneous income per capita, 
and we include in the second-, third-, and fourth-generation immigrants individuals with at least 
one parent born in the country. We focus on inherited trust of second-generation individuals 
born before 1885, third-generation born before 1910, and fourth-generation born before 1935. 
Inherited attitudes in 2000 are similar to those estimated in the previous section. The sample of 
individual characteristics is reported in Table A3. We only select countries of origin with more 
than ten observations in the individual regressions on the trust question. This leads to work with 
a sample of 15 countries per period in the macroeconomic estimates of income per capita.
Inherited trust is measured by running OLS estimates for the periods 1910 and 2000 and by 
controlling for age, education, and gender. The results are unchanged when controlling also for 
Figure 9. Correlation between Income per Capita and Inherited Trust in 2000, Relative to Sweden.  
Minimum 50 Year Lag between Ancestors’ Immigration Wave and Contemporaneous Income per Capita
Sources: Maddison database and GSS 1977–2004.
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Table 7—Inherited Trust and Income per Capita: Lag of at Least 50 Years between Inherited Trust  
and Income per Capita
Dependent variable:
Income per capita in 1935 and 2000
(1) (2) (3)
Inherited trust in 1935 and 2000 
Minimum 50 years lag
23,004.56***
(7,523.35)
26,124.64**
(9,079.68)
14,903.50** 
(6,905.15)
Initial income per capita 1870 and 1930 4.43***
(1.03)
Political institutions in 1930 and 2000 −71.63
(123.87)
Country dummies No Yes*** Yes***
R2 0.23 0.59 0.82
Observations 32 32 32
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries in 1935 and 2000, relative 
to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. We measure the trust that the ancestors of the US immigrants have transmitted 
to their descendants at least 50 years before the period 1935 and 2000. Inherited trust of US immigrants from the source 
countries for the periods 1935 and 2000 is estimated relative to the trust inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ances-
tors for those periods. The coefficients of inherited trust come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions 
are measured by the index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institutions. 
Institutions in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 8 —Inherited Trust in 1910 and 2000
Dependent variables
Inherited trust in 1910 Inherited trust in 2000
(1) (2)
Coeff Standard error Coeff Standard error
Country of origin Swedish ancestors - 1910: Reference
Sweden 0.169*** (0.025)
Africa −0.137*** (0.008) −0.154*** (0.036)
Canada 0.371*** (0.007) 0.147*** (0.026)
Czech Republic 0.150*** (0.062) 0.062** (0.021)
Denmark 0.071*** (0.003) 0.215*** (0.025)
France 0.045*** (0.003) 0.016 (0.033)
Germany 0.083*** (0.003) 0.063* (0.030)
Ireland 0.076*** (0.004) 0.074** (0.030)
Italy 0.133*** (0.005) 0.015 (0.024)
Netherlands 0.036*** (0.005) 0.092*** (0.028)
Norway 0.158*** (0.001) 0.212*** (0.025)
Poland −0.040*** (0.011) 0.065*** (0.022)
Spain 0.036*** (0.004) 0.160*** (0.030)
Switzerland 0.249*** (0.004) 0.222*** (0.030)
United Kingdom 0.097*** (0.002) 0.078*** (0.030)
R2 0.094
Observations 7,032
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of trust inherited by US immigrants for the periods 
1910 and 2000. Additional controls: age, gender, education. OLS regressions with robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the country level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: General Social Survey 1977–2004.
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income, employment, and religion but based on fewer observations. Inherited attitudes of Swedish 
Americans in 1910 are taken as the reference group. The coefficients are reported in Table 8, and 
standard errors are clustered at the country level. The gap in inherited trust between the periods 
1910 and 2000 is even sharper than the one previously found between the periods 1935 and 2000. 
Among the descendants of early immigrants, the level of trust inherited from France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom was much higher than that transmitted from Sweden in 1910. Inherited 
trust from Germany and the United Kingdom were 8.3 percentage points and 9.7 percentage points 
higher relative to Swedish immigrants. The only countries of origin from which inherited trust in 
1910 is lower than that of Sweden are Africa and Poland. The effect of the country of origin asso-
ciated with inherited trust in 1910 is almost always statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Strikingly, British, French, or German descendants of immigrants have more significant differences 
in inherited trust, relative to the descendants of Swedish immigrants, in 1910 than in 2000.
Inherited Trust and Economic Development between 1910 and 2000.—Figure 10 reports the 
 correlation between inherited trust and income per capita in 1910, relative to Sweden. The correla-
tion is positive and steady; the coefficient of determination is equal to 0.33. European continental 
countries like France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and Anglo-Saxon countries like the United 
Kingdom, were more economically advanced and had higher social attitudes than Sweden at that 
time.
Table 9 reports the regressions including both periods 1910 and 2000 at the cross-country level. 
Column 1 shows the bottom down regression without additional controls. Column 2 includes lagged 
income per capita in 1870 and 1930. Column 3 adds contemporaneous values of political institu-
tions (averages over the period, 1910–1913 and 2000–2003), all measured relative to Sweden. The 
cross-country correlation is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level.
Table 10 reports the correlation between change in inherited trust and change in income per 
capita between 1910 and 2000 by controlling for country fixed effects. Column 1 shows a statisti-
cally significant and economically sizeable relationship. Column 2 includes the lagged value of 
income per capita. The correlation between inherited trust and income per capita is still statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level. We provide additional tests below.
C. Additional Controls
We can also check for omitted variables by including additional controls. Our previous regres-
sions control for both time invariant country effects and time varying political and economic fac-
tors. But it might be the case that changes in inherited trust capture changes in more general cultural 
attitudes or social norms. We allow for this possibility by looking at other cultural attitudes that 
might matter for explaining growth. We show the result for the periods 1935 and 2000 when impos-
ing a minimum lag of 25 years in inherited attitudes, since these periods provide the maximum 
number of observations. We have run the regressions for the periods 1910–2000 and 1935–2000, 
with a lag of at least 50 years in inherited attitudes. These estimates yield the same conclusions.
We first include additional measures of social attitudes by controlling for religion and educa-
tion. We measure the share of nonreligious persons per country in the 1900s and 2000s by using 
the Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary database on religion. We include the measure of fraction-
alization in religious groups for this period, measured by the Herfindal index. Furthermore, we 
also control for a historical measure of education in the country of origin by measuring primary 
school enrollment, taken from Aaron Benavot and Phyllis Riddle (1988). We use the country 
level in 1870–1875 and 1935–1940 and express school enrollment relative to Sweden.
Second, we look at the evolution of other inherited attitudes toward work, family, the gov-
ernment, and business. We measure these attitudes by using the GSS and by estimating their 
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inherited component in 1935 and 2000. We measure the belief of the respondent regarding impor-
tant driving forces of success in life by using the GSS question: “Some people say that people 
get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are 
more important.” The answers are given on a scale of 1 to 3, which correspond to “Hard work 
most important,” “Hard work and luck equally important,” and “Luck most important.” We cre-
ate a variable equal to 1 if the individual believes in hard work and to 0 otherwise. We also look 
at traditional family values regarding gender roles with the question “Do you approve or disap-
prove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of 
supporting her?” The answer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves and to 0 
otherwise. The main question on the role of government in the GSS reads “Government should 
do something to reduce income differences between rich and poor or government should not 
concern itself with income differences.” The answers are scaled from 1 to 7, lower scores indicat-
ing preference for government intervention. We measure attitudes toward business by using the 
following question: “Do you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any 
confidence at all in major companies?” We still measure inherited attitudes relative to Swedish 
Americans in 1935 and 2000 by running OLS estimates on the two periods and controlling for 
age, gender, education, income, employment status, and religion.
Table 11 reports the effect of changes in inherited trust when we include other inherited social 
attitudes. Column 1 includes inherited attitudes toward work, column 2 includes inherited con-
fidence in business, column 3 includes inherited attitudes in favor of government  intervention 
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Sources: Maddison database and GSS 1977–2004.
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Table 9—Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita in 1910 and 2000:  
Cross-Country Regression
Dependent variable:
Income per capita in 1910 and 2000
(1) (2) (3)
Inherited trust in 1910 and 2000 21,027.76*** 
(6,317.44)
15,499.99** 
(5,085.94)
18,155.19** 
(7,901.45)
Initial income per capita 
 in 1870 and 1930
3.76*** 
(0.85)
3.79*** 
(0.86)
Political institutions 
 in 1910 and 2000
−117.45 
(264.69)
Country fixed effect No No No
Adj-R2 0.25 0.54 0.53
Observations 30 30 30
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries 
in 1910 and 2000, relative to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. Inherited trust of US immi-
grants from the source countries for the periods 1910 and 2000 is estimated relative to the 
trust inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ancestors for those periods. The coefficients of 
inherited trust come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions are measured by the 
index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institu-
tions. Institutions in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 10—Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita in 1910 and 2000: Within Estimates
Dependent variable:
Income per capita in 1910 and 2000
(1) (2) (3)
Inherited trust in 1910 and
 2000
22,903.31** 
(8,709.25)
17,286.24** 
(6,346.56)
8,694.28 
(12,536.38)
Initial income per capita 1870 
 and 1930
4.85***
(1.22)
4.82***
(1.24)
Political constraints 1910
 and 2000
349.15
(437.32)
Country  fixed effect Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
R2 0.51 0.77 0.78
Observations 30 30 30
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries 
in 1910 and 2000, relative to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. Inherited trust of US immi-
grants from the source countries for the periods 1910 and 2000 is estimated relative to the 
trust inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ancestors for those periods. The coefficients of 
inherited trust come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions are measured by the 
index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institu-
tions. Institutions in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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to reduce inequality, and column 4 controls for inherited attitudes in favor of working women. 
None of the correlations between these inherited attitudes and income per capita are statisti-
cally significant. In contrast, changes in inherited trust remain statistically significant at the 1 
or 5 percent level, and the effect is still sizeable. Column 5 includes all the attitudes in a single 
regression. Inherited trust becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent level. But none of 
the other variables, including lagged income per capita, is statistically significant, suggesting 
data limitation.
Table 12 reports the results when we control for social or cultural changes in the home country. 
Columns 1 to 3 include changes in the shares of educated people, of nonreligious persons, and of 
religious fractionalization respectively. All variables are calculated relative to Sweden. Column 4 
includes all the controls taken together. For each specification, the correlation between changes 
in inherited trust and changes in income per capita remains statistically significant at the 1 or 5 
percent level, and the coefficient is of the same order of magnitude.
V.  Conclusion
This paper provides a new empirical strategy to uncover the causal effect of trust on growth. 
We track changes in trust levels inherited by different generations of Americans from the coun-
tries of their immigrant forebears as a measure of the evolution of trust in those source coun-
tries. By using this inherited component of trust and its time variation, we are able to isolate 
Table 11—Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita in 1935 and 2000: Additional Controls (I)
Dependent variable: 
Income per capita in 1935 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inherited trust in 1935 and 2000 24,139.51*** 
(7,586.25)
32,133.31*** 
(10,949.69)
29,875.68*** 
(8,423.30)
28,397.90*** 
(7,196.21)
31,429.61* 
(10,778.15)
Initial income per capita in 1870 
 and 1930
2.76**
(0.99)
2.69**
(1.07)
2.93**
(1.08)
2.33**
(1.06)
2.16*
(1.09)
Political institutions in 1930 
 and 2000
−173.62*
(87.94)
−134.57**
(95.97)
−120.21*
(113.74)
−67.85
(105.48)
−27.05
(121.79)
Inherited attitudes toward work 
 and origins of success
15,557.01
(10,012.16)
19,921.46* 
(10,177.59)
Inherited confidence in business −6,472.75
(13,249.42)
−10,179.00
(12,657.09)
Inherited attitudes toward 
 government intervention
−1,086.05 
(2,533.69)
−1,391.67
(2,375.70)
Inherited attitudes toward gender  
 division of work
11,860.37 
(8,567.71)
13,506.70
(8,402.54)
Country fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
R2 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.90
Observations 46 46 46 46 46
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries in 1935 and 2000, relative 
to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. Inherited trust and attitudes of US immigrants from the source countries for the 
periods 1935 and 2000 are estimated relative to the trust and attitudes inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ances-
tors for those periods. The coefficients come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions are measured by the 
index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institutions. Institutions in the source 
countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the specific impact of trust on economic development relative to other traditional candidates—
like institutions and geography—captured by the country fixed effects. Inherited trust turns 
out to explain a significant share of the economic backwardness of developing countries and 
an important share of economic differences between developed countries over the twentieth 
century.
This paper focuses on the economic consequences of changes in inherited trust. A remaining 
question is the underlying causes for such changes. The twentieth century is full of potential can-
didates, including the two World Wars, the economic crisis of the 1930s, and the emergence of 
totalitarianism and communism as opposed to the emergence of social democracies and coopera-
tive social dialogue. These events have had heterogeneous effects across generations and coun-
tries. The link between such events and changes in trust remains to be explored, along the lines 
of, among others, Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007) and Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (forth-
coming), and Aghion et al. (2010).
Appendix
A. Decomposition of Inherited Trust by Wave of Immigration and Age
In the benchmark estimates, we group together different generations of immigration of dif-
ferent ages to analyze the correlation between inherited trust of US immigrants and trust in the 
country of origin. In this Appendix we assess the robustness of this correlation by decomposing 
by subgroups the inherited trust of US immigrants for the periods 1935 and 2000. We estimate 
the correlation with trust in the home country by replacing the country of origin  fixed effect by 
Table 12—Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita in 1935 and 2000: Additional Controls (II)
Dependent variables: Income per capita in 1935 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inherited trust in 1935 and 2000 23,520.25**
(9,357.68)
31,995.81***
(9,148.59)
32,265.39**
(8,765.55)
3,1215.1***
(7,674.84)
Initial income per capita in 1870 and 1930 1.62** 
(0.77)
0.24** 
(0.95)
1.43 
(0.88)
1.61** 
(0.73)
Political institutions in 1930 and 2000 −383.44**
(128.64)
−229.87*
(109.80)
−109.17
(126.93)
−68.27
(128.69)
Preschool enrollment in 1870 and 1930 10,914.09**
(5,515.04)
8,261.16*
(4,520.91)
Nonreligious persons in 1900 and 2000 −3,145.13
(7,098.95)
−29,102.94***
(9,268.96)
Religious fractionalization in 1900 and 2000 −6,190.92
(4,358.18)
−22,405.04***
(5,763.20)
Country  fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
R2 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.83
Observations 46 46 46 46
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries in 1935 and 2000, relative 
to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. Inherited trust and attitudes of US immigrants from the source countries for the 
periods 1935 and 2000 are estimated relative to the trust and attitudes inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ancestors 
for those periods. The coefficients of inherited trust come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions are mea-
sured by the index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institutions. Institutions 
in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the average trust in the source country, measured by the WVS 2000. These estimates are run on 
the GSS over the period 1977–2004, as in the main section. In the benchmark regressions, the 
inherited trust for the period 1935 corresponds to that of second generation born before 1910, 
third generation born before 1935, and fourth generation born before 1960. Here, we run the esti-
mates for inherited trust in 1935 separately on the two subgroups of second- and third-generation 
immigrants on one hand, and on the subgroup of fourth generation on the other hand. Table 13 
columns 1 and 2 show that no correlation shows up between trust of US immigrants belonging to 
the different subgroups of inherited trust in 1935 and trust in the home country in 2000.
Table 14—Inherited Trust and Income Per Capita in 1935 and 2000:  
Robustness Checks for the Trust Indicator
Dependent variable: Income per capita in 1935 and 2000
Trust1 Trust2 Trust3
Inherited trust 
 in 1935 and 2000
26,332.67***
(7,473.67)
26,603.70***
(7,090.23)
26,249.95**
(7,060.58)
Initial income per capita 
 in 1870 and 1930
3.03***
(1.04)
2.81**
(1.04)
2.92**
(1.03)
Political institutions 
 in 1930 and 2000
−142. 02**
(92.49)
−157.11*
(90.30)
−156.31*
(90.62)
Country fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Adj-R2 0.86 0.86 0.86
Observations 46 46 46
Notes: OLS regressions. Trust1 = 3 for trust, 2 for depends, 1 for no trust. Trust2 = 1 for trust, 
0 for no trust. Answer “Depends” deleted. Trust3 = 1 for trust and depends, 0 for no trust.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 13—Correlation between Inherited Trust and Trust in the Source Country: 
 Subgroups by Waves of Immigration
Dependent variables
Inherited trust
2nd-3d generation
Period 1935
Inherited trust 
4th generation
Period 1935
Inherited trust 
2nd-3d generation
Period 2000
Inherited trust 
4th generation
Period 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in source country 
 WVS 2000
0.207 
(0.132)
0.395 
(0.303)
0.408*** 
(0.082)
0.461** 
(0.211)
Observations 753 5,782 2,426 2,065
R2 0.064 0.081 0.066 0.066
Notes: The dependent variables are (1) the level of trust inherited by second-generation and third-generation US immi-
grants in the period 1935; (2) the level of trust inherited by fourth-generation US immigrants in the period 1935; (3) the 
level of trust inherited by second-generation and third-generation US immigrants in the period 2000; (4) the level of trust 
inherited by fourth-generation US immigrants in the period 2000. Trust in source country is the average level of trust in 
the source country of the US immigrants in the period 2000. Additional controls: age, gender, education, income, employ-
ment status, and religion. OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: General Social Survey 1977–2004; World Values Survey wave 2000.
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Regarding the inherited trust for the period 2000, the benchmark regressions above include the 
second-generation Americans born between 1910 and 1975, the third generation born after 1935 
and the fourth-generation Americans born after 1960. We now propose to distinguish the two 
subgroups of second- and third-generation immigrants on one hand, and the subgroup of fourth 
generation on the other hand. Table 13 columns 3 and 4 show the correlation between inherited 
trust in 2000 and trust in the home country by subgroups. The correlation is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 and 5 percent level, consistently with the aggregate group of inherited trust in 2000.
B. Trust Indicator
Table 14 reports the effect of inherited trust on income per capita when we use different 
measures of the trust indicator. The trust variable in the GSS takes on three values: “Most 
people can be trusted,” “Depends,” and “Can’t be too careful.” In the main section, we group 
together the answers “Depends” and “Can’t be too careful.” Table 14 column 1 reports the 
results using the original trust variable, Trust1, equal to 3 for “Most people can be trusted,” 2 
for “Depends,” and 1 for “Can’t be too careful.” The right-hand side variable corresponds to 
the coefficients of the country of origin, estimated with ordered probit regression on the origi-
nal trust variable at the individual level. Table 14 column 2 reports the results when we use 
the trust dummy, Trust2, equal to 1 for “Most people can be trusted” and 0 for “Can’t be too 
careful.” In this case, the answer “Depends” is dropped. The right-hand side variable corre-
sponds to the coefficients of the country of origin, estimated with OLS regression on the vari-
able Trust2 at the individual level. Table 14 column 3 reports the results when we use the trust 
dummy, Trust3, equal to 1 for “Most people can be trusted” and “Depends” and 0 for “Can’t 
be too careful.” The right-hand side variable corresponds to the coefficients of the country of 
origin, estimated with OLS regression on the variable Trust3 at the individual level.
For all specifications, the impact of inherited trust on income per capita is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients associated with inherited trust for the variables trust2 
and trust3 are of the same order as the one found in the main section.
Table 15—Inherited Trust and Income per Capita in 1950 and 2000 - Lag of 75 Years in Inherited Trust
Dependent variable: Income per capita in 1950 and 2000
(1) (2) (3)
Inherited trust in 1950 and 2000 
 Minimum lag of 75 years
31,319.76*** 
(8,243.81)
34,200.61*** 
(9,001.73)
24,195.65*** 
(6,824.92)
Initial income per capita 
 1870 and 1930
3.64*** 
(0.78)
Political constraints 
 1950 and 2000
−25.74 
(91.14)
Country dummies  No Yes*** Yes***
R2 0.30  0.73 0.89
Observations 34 34 34
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the GDP per capita in the source countries in 1950 and 2000, relative 
to Sweden. Data come from Maddison. We measure the trust that the ancestors of the US immigrants have transmitted 
to their descendants at least 75 years before the period 1950 and 2000. Inherited trust of US immigrants from the source 
countries for the periods 1950 and 2000 is estimated relative to the trust inherited by US immigrants with Swedish ances-
tors for those periods. The coefficients of inherited trust come from the regressions on the GSS. Political institutions 
are measured by the index Polity2 from the Polity IV database. A higher level indicates more democratic institutions. 
Institutions in the source countries are measured relative to Sweden. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A1—Samples of the GSS and WVS
General Social Survey World Values Survey
N
“Trust most 
other people”
“Can’t be too 
careful” “Depends” N
“Trust most other 
people / Can’t be 
too careful” 1–0
Africa 3,095 0.17 0.79 0.04 4,109 0.14
Austria 230 0.44 0.50 0.06 1,520 0.33
Belgium 58 0.51 0.49 0.0 1,823 0.29
Canada 488 0.41 0.55 0.04 1,811 0.37
Czech Republic 458 0.44 0.49 0.07 1,840 0.25
Denmark 277 0.53 0.43 0.04 1,013 0.66
Finland 180 0.52 0.41 0.07 988 0.58
France 761 0.44 0.50 0.06 1,587 0.21
Germany 6,276 0.44 0.52 0.04 2,019 0.37
Hungary 228 0.43 0.52 0.02 985 0.24
India 120 0.29 0.60 0.11 1,337 0.38
Ireland 4,144 0.45 0.50 0.05 965 0.36
Italy 1,949 0.38 0.57 0.05 1,950 0.32
Mexico 990 0.25 0.70 0.05 1,124 0.20
Netherlands 595 0.42 0.54 0.06 984 0.60
Norway 690 0.57 0.40 0.03 1,101 0.66
Poland 1,098 0.43 0.52 0.05 1,090 0.18
Portugal 90 0.35 0.59 0.06 901 0.12
Russia 554 0.47 0.47 0.06 2,480 0.23
Spain 320 0.33 0.63 0.04 2,232 0.36
Sweden 598 0.51 0.44 0.05 913 0.67
Switzerland 154 0.54 0.41 0.05 1,103 0.37
United Kingdom 5,941 0.50 0.45 0.05 884 0.27
Yugoslavia 146 0.48 0.47 0.05 1,194 0.16
Table A2—Observations for Inherited Trust in 1935 and 2000: GSS 1977–2004
Country of origin Inherited trust in 1935 Inherited trust in 2000
Africa 1,720 673
Austria 36 97
Belgium 12 23
Canada 138 173
Czech Republic 94 221
Denmark 99 78
Finland 38 75
France 329 189
Germany 2,852 1,602
Hungary 20 104
India 7 11
Ireland 2,017 1,036
Italy 216 1,103
Mexico 93 394
Netherlands 249 147
Norway 255 223
Poland 156 556
Portugal 11 40
Russia 51 272
Spain 82 80
Sweden 207 222
Switzerland 64 34
United Kingdom 3,282 1,071
Yugoslavia 14 86
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C. Generation Lag of 75 Years
This Appendix assesses the impact of inherited trust on income per capita when we impose a 
minimum lag of three generations, which corresponds to 75 years, between these two variables. 
To get enough observations for inherited trust, this analysis required working with two closer 
periods for income per capita than in our benchmark case. We consider the periods 1950 and 
2000. The income per capita in 1950 is measured as an average between 1949 and 1953. To get 
enough observations, we include in the second-, third-, and fourth-generation immigrants indi-
viduals with at least one parent born in the country.
Following our estimation strategy with a lag of 75 years for inherited trust, income per capita in 
1950 is explained by inherited trust of second-generation US immigrants born before 1885, third-
generation born before 1910, and fourth-generation born before 1935.7 Income per capita in 2000 
7 For explaining the outcome in 1950, we impose a minimum lag of 65 years instead of 75 years. This allows us to get 
enough observations on second-generation immigrants born before 1885 instead of 1875, third-generation immigrants 
born before 1910 instead of 1900, and fourth-generation immigrants born before 1935 instead of 1925.
Table A3—Descriptive Statistics: GSS 1977–2004
Variable Cohort 1910 Cohort 1935 Cohort 2000
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 67.26 11.08 51.86 16.69 36.87 14.77
Men 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.49
Education 11.83 3.33 12.85 3.03 13.45 2.57
Income 9.29 2.95 10.09 2.65 10.43 2.53
Inactive 0.67 0.46 0.39 0.48 0.25 0.43
Unemployed 0 0 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.11
Employed 0.31 0.46 0.58 0.49 0.71 0.45
Catholic 0.12 0.32 0.18 0.38 0.39 0.48
Protestant 0.84 0.36 0.74 0.43 0.45 0.49
No religion 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32
Table A4—Observations for Inherited Trust: Lag 50 Years - GSS 1977–2004
Country of origin
Inherited trust in 1935  
Minimum lag 50 years
Inherited trust in 2000  
Minimum lag 50 years
N N
Africa 561 1,836
Canada 34 318
Czech Republic 17 314
Denmark 22 169
France 104 429
Germany 857 3,745
Ireland 698 2,417
Italy 16 1,360
Mexico 16 539
Netherlands 98 326
Norway 49 456
Poland 13 734
Spain 20 152
Sweden 36 411
Switzerland 25 85
United Kingdom 1,445 3,011
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is explained by inherited trust of second-generation immigrants born before 1925 and after 1885, 
third-generation immigrants born before 1950 and after 1910, and fourth-generation immigrants 
born before 1975 and after 1935 (to avoid an overlap with inherited attitudes in 1950). We have 
more than 15 observations per country of origin for the period 1950 for the following 17 countries 
or continents: Africa, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
Table 15 reports the impact of inherited trust on income per capita in 1950 and 2000. Columns 
1 and 2 report the results for between and within regressions without additional controls. Column 
3 shows the within estimates controlling for lagged income per capita and political institutions 
in 1950 and 2000. The impact of inherited trust on income per capita is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level for each specification.
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